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Abstract 
Most studies that discuss the normalisation process between Kosovo and Serbia 
note that the Brussels agreement from April 2013 was a remarkable achievement. 
Some opinion-makers even go so far as to suggest that a Nobel Peace Prize is due. 
The process allowed the parties to the agreement to bridge a seemingly 
irreconcilable gap, yet few scholars have tried to discern the mechanisms of how 
striking a deal became politically feasible. This study shows how the Brussels 
agreement was shaped by ambiguity, and how it in turn affected the narratives of 
the post-agreement phase. A theoretical framework is constructed as a part of the 
research design, and by using the Brussels agreement as a typical case for 
ambiguous post-conflict negotiation, the study also argues that ambiguity as a 
concept deserves a place in the limelight. Findings suggest that theory on the subject 
is in dire need of development, in particular that future research should focus on 
ambiguous processes, in contrast to the current fixation on language.  
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1 Reconciling the irreconcilable 
After four long hours of negotiations on 19 April 2013, the prime ministers of 
Kosovo and Serbia agreed on a document containing fifteen bullet points whose 
significance was received as an “an earthquake in Balkan politics: the ground 
lurched, familiar landmarks toppled, the aftershocks are still rumbling and the new 
contours are only slowly emerging”.1 To the European Union and its high 
representative, under whose auspices the accord had been brokered, the tedious 
campaign to bridge a seemingly irreconcilable gap between the two parties finally 
seemed to yield results. The fifteen articles stipulated rules and steps aimed at 
setting the framework for normalised relations. Much of the attention was devoted 
to northern Kosovo,2 a geographical area that had proven to be highly sensitive in 
the interaction between Belgrade and Pristina. An implementation committee was 
to be formed within two weeks to put into effect what has since been labelled the 
‘Brussels agreement’. 
The content and extent of the agreement were surprising, as official the 
exchange between the two governments since long had evoked strong reactions 
domestically, not least regarding the question of Kosovo’s political status. Whereas 
Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, the preamble of Serbia’s constitution 
obliges “all state bodies to uphold and protect the state interests of Serbia in 
Kosovo”.3 In light of these obstacles, the question inevitably arises of how the 
decision-makers could find common ground, when the electorate, the political 
opposition and even the constitutions pointed in another direction. It is against this 
backdrop that the Brussels agreement becomes so intriguing; how could the parties 
manage the problem of reconciling the seemingly irreconcilable? 
1.1 Flexibility through ambiguity 
Accompanied by an air of finalisation, high-level agreements typically convey a 
perception of a self-regulatory post-contract period. Yet history has repeatedly 
shown that the ink on an accord barely has had the time to dry before another vital 
phase commences – the struggle over interpretations. This is no less true in the case 
                                                 
1 M. Prelec, The Kosovo-Serbia Agreement: Why less is more, Europe and Central Asia, [web 
blog], 7 May 2013, http://blog.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/2013/05/07/the-kosovo-serbia-
agreement-why-less-is-more/, (accessed 22 April 2015). 
2 The municipalities concerned are North Mitrovica, Leposavić, Zvečan and Zubin Potok. 
3 Republic of Serbia: Government, Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 
http://www.srbija.gov.rs/cinjenice_o_srbiji/ustav.php?change_lang=en, (accessed 22 October 
2015).  
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of the Brussels agreement, where the delegations shared their differing views with 
the media, already as they were leaving the negotiation facilities.4 The fact that 
contractual language, agreed upon by both parties, allows for contradictory 
interpretations suggests a notable amount of flexibility. This flexibility in 
interpretation is a result of the concept that is to lie at the heart of this study: 
ambiguity. 
Some theorist and opinion-makers would answer the question posed above by 
referring to the use of ambiguity as an enabling strategy, arguing that it was a 
prerequisite for reaching the Brussels agreement – both from the view of the 
negotiating parties and from the side of the EU. However, the occurrences of 
ambiguity in carefully negotiated texts seem to pose yet another conundrum: why 
would stakeholders allow uncertainty in high-stake agreements that seemingly have 
as sole purpose to regulate the resolution of conflicting interests? Intuitively, using 
precise and exhaustive language should be the first priority when negotiating 
solutions to sensitive issues. Ambiguity theorists would claim that the opposite is 
true. In their view, actors resort to vagueness in situations where the use of precise 
language could result in unwanted outcomes. Imagine, for example, decision-
makers facing an imminent collapse of negotiations or confronting a situation in 
which their electoral support is in jeopardy. In these situations, ambiguous language 
can cloak concessions or give an appearance of progress. But at the same time, 
scholars emphasise that ambiguity also inherently infuse risks to a negotiation 
process. They argue that that ensuring compliance is made more difficult and that 
the parties can become trapped into lowest-common-denominator processes. 
1.2 Towards a greater understanding of ambiguity 
The social sciences literature offers quite a mosaic image of ambiguity as a concept, 
often only providing snippets of its underlying logic, or mentioning it in the passing. 
Most theorists take the written word as the point of departure while a few have seen 
the processes within negotiations as more pertinent for scrutiny. Others note with 
concern that ambiguity “has slipped from our conceptual vocabulary in recent 
years”.5 It is against this scattered picture that this study takes its departure, as an 
effort to investigate how ambiguity came to shape the processes of normalisation 
through the Brussels agreement. Simply put – ambiguity as an agent for change. 
There are several reasons for why exploring the ambiguity in the Brussels 
agreement is particularly relevant. First, although the term ‘ambiguous’ was 
mentioned frequently as the agreement was made public, the degree to which this 
correlates with existing theory has not been examined. Second, and in a broader 
                                                 
4 EurActiv, After deal with Kosovo, Serbia to seek date for EU accession talks, 22 April 2013, 
http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/serbia-request-date-opening-eu-a-news-519254, (accessed 
15 August 2015). 
5 J. Best, ‘Ambiguity, Uncertainty and Risk: Rethinking Indeterminacy’, International Political 
Sociology, vol. 2, no. 4, 2008, p. 356. 
  3 
perspective, the lack of coherent theory of ambiguity as phenomena open up for 
venturing into uncharted territory. This could notably benefit the field of peace and 
conflict studies in general, and of mediation and conflict management processes in 
particular. Third, the increasingly ambitious and comprehensive external policy of 
the EU has been cemented both in treaty and in strategy.6 Investigating the Union’s 
mediatory role becomes more relevant as its engagement in the proximity deepens, 
its mediating role becomes more commonplace and integration with the 
Enlargement and Neighbourhood countries intensifies. Taken together, the 
ambiguous Brussels agreement warrants careful scrutiny. Consequently, this study 
will be guided by the following research questions: 
 How was the Brussels agreement, including its immediate aftermath, 
shaped by ambiguity? 
 
With a descriptive research question, such as the one leading this inquiry, the 
ambition is to “give maximal information about the specific features and 
characteristics of a particular social phenomenon”.7 Accordingly, a design suited 
for that purpose will be outlined in the next chapter. 
                                                 
6 See for example European Union, ‘Chapter 2 Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy’, Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, (2008/C 115/01), 2008.; and J. Solana, A Secure Europe in a 
Better World: European Security Strategy, European Council, 2003, 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/european-security-strategy/, (accessed 1 November 
2015). 
7 I. Bleijenbergh, ‘Case selection’, in A.J. Mills, G. Durepos and E. Wiebe (eds.), Encyclopaedia 
of Case Study Research, Thousand Oaks CA, SAGE, 2009, p. 61.  
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2 Research design 
In a domain often characterised by the dichotomy of qualitative and quantitative 
designs, it should be pointed out early that this study belongs to the former category, 
and thus will move within the realm of concepts that are not easily enumerated. The 
research operationalisation will follow the common path of qualitative endeavours, 
which traditionally have investigated topics such as ideas, events, decisions, 
institutions and legislation.8 It might be worth recalling, however, that the tension 
between the qualitative and quantitative schools of thought is artificial since both 
designs share the same goal: to make “inferences from available evidence”.9 
Methodology scholars have called for proper accounts of the basic logics of the 
chosen method according to “rules of scientific inference” – a practice that 
otherwise tend to be more prevalent in quantitative studies.10 For that reason, one 
aim of this study is to be clear and precise about theoretical claims, assumptions 
and conclusions.  
Another longstanding debate concerns what method to use, based on their 
particular pros and cons. My perspective echoes that of George and Bennet, in that 
a healthy dialogue on methodological choices requires an “understanding of the 
comparative strengths and limits of various methods, and how they complement 
each other”.11 In other words, while a certain method is suited for answering a 
particular type of question, it may very well be inept at addressing another. Most 
fitting for this inquiry is to gravitate towards describing and interpreting rather than 
trying to fully explain. This is partly motivated by the conviction that a thorough 
description has immensely greater value than a poor portrayal of cause and effect.12 
In a sense, the purpose is to scratch the surface in terms of mapping actor’s 
strategies, which could be seen more like “a starting point” towards a question 
beginning with a ‘why’.13 
                                                 
8 King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing social inquiry, pp. 4–5. 
9 T. Landman, Issues and methods in comparative politics: an introduction, New York, Routledge, 
2008, p. 20. 
10 King, Keohane, and Verba, pp. 4–5. 
11 A.L. George and A. Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the Social Sciences, 
Cambridge, MIT Press, 2005, p. 5. 
12 R. Hague and M. Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, pp. 80–81. 
13 M. Hollis and S. Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1990, p. 100. 
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2.1 The Brussels agreement as a single-case 
This study is a case study, which has been described as a “detailed examination of 
an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may 
be generalizable to other events”14 that in turn is “cumulated into a body of general 
knowledge”.15 Case studies are useful where conceptual complexity is high and for 
developing theory.16 They also suited for in-depth examinations of multiple 
variables within one single event and have strong potential for generating new 
hypotheses.17 A thorough examination of a case also has the benefit of resulting in 
a “detailed and elaborate description of the phenomenon”.18 
A case should also be understood as “an instance of a class of events”. Examples 
of these ‘classes’ are forms of governments, peace processes or policies.19 
However, since single historical events always consist of several cases, the 
researcher must choose what particularities to study. The event that is in focus in 
this paper, for example, can be seen as a case of a reconciliation process, as well as 
a case of individual political leadership, and a case of treaty design, and so on.20 
‘Ambiguous post-conflict agreements’ is the primary class of events to which 
knowledge might be generalised from this study, and the Brussels agreement is the 
single case from which knowledge will be generated. 
The choice of investigating only one or a few cases should not be made without 
consideration. In his critique of comparative studies, Lijphart pointed out the main 
weakness eloquently: “many variables, small number of cases”.21 George and 
Bennet repeat this aspect in their book on case studies and theoretical development 
and stress that such designs are restricted to making “only tentative conclusions” 
on the impact of a specific variable. Nonetheless, in the trade-off between scale and 
depth, case studies come out strong in their potential for investigating the borders 
and scope of theories in greater detail. And it is exactly at this point that the present 
study will be aware of its limitations and strengths. Rather than faulty assumptions 
of wide-reaching applicability, it has a more modest ambition of adding to the 
accumulation of theory and shedding light on the phenomena of ambiguity in 
negotiation processes. In the words of George and Bennet: “case studies remain 
much stronger at assessing whether and how a variable mattered to the outcome 
than at assessing how much it mattered”.22 As such, the single-case design will be 
used the way it usually is – by developing theory.23 
                                                 
14 George and Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the Social Sciences, p. 5. 
15 Hague and Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics, pp. 80–81. 
16 H. Xiao, ‘Single Case-studies’, in A.J. Mills, G. Durepos and E. Wiebe (eds.), Encyclopaedia of 
Case Study Research, Thousand Oaks CA, SAGE, 2009, p. 869. 
17 George and Bennett, p. 5. 
18 Bleijenbergh, Encyclopedia of Case Study Research, p. 61. 
19 George and Bennett, p. 17. 
20 George and Bennett, p. 18. 
21 A. Lijphart, ‘Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method’, The American 
Political Science Review, vol. 65, no. 3, 1971, p. 685. 
22 George and Bennett, p 25. 
23 Xiao, Encyclopedia of Case Study Research, p. 869. 
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Another reoccurring topic of debate is the risk that selecting cases based on the 
dependent variable can cause bias. Yet, even studies based on single cases can be 
valuable, for example by locating unnecessary variables or circumstances. 
Moreover, case studies prepare the ground for further research where the variables 
can be modified.24 Investigations in which the researcher is acquainted with a case 
beforehand have also received criticism on the grounds that formulation of 
hypotheses can become skewed. However, that argument has been rebutted by 
scholars showing that foreknowledge is useful in the process of selecting cases.25 
2.2 The agreement as a typical case 
Within its class of events mentioned above, the negotiation between Kosovo and 
Serbia is a typical case. That means that it belongs to the most common category of 
case studies,26 which “are as useful as they are undramatic”.27 When designing a 
typical case-study, the objective is to identify an event that is representative of a 
particular phenomenon.28 They are “often used as a caricature of an event” from 
which knowledge can be deduced.29 In order to meet the basic prerequisite of having 
relevance, the case must have a potential to “provide insights to a broader 
phenomenon” and be representative of a wider set of cases.30 It should ideally also 
be selected deliberately rather than through a process of chance.31  
For these reasons, a few basic parameters were defined that the case had to 
fulfil: 1) the negotiation outcome contained ambiguities; 2) the parties had 
previously been in open conflict; and 3) the agreement concerned ‘high-stake 
issues’. This class of events is wide enough to encompass several interesting cases, 
such as the peace negotiations in Northern Ireland in the 1990s or the recent peace 
agreement in South Sudan. To pass the ‘representative test’, the Brussels agreement 
had to be at least as characteristic of the class, as for example these two. Here Yin 
emphasises that the researcher must be attentive so as to avoid that the case “later 
turn out not to be what it was thought to be”.32 In that spirit, the question of 
representability will be touched upon in the concluding chapter. 
                                                 
24 George and Bennett, p. 23. 
25 George and Bennett, p. 24. 
26 Hague and Harrop, pp. 80-81. 
27 J. Gerring and J. Seawright, ‘Techniques for choosing cases’, in J. Gerring (ed.), Case study 
research: Principles and practices, New York, Cambridge University Press 2007, p. 91. 
28 Bleijenbergh, Encyclopedia of Case Study Research, p. 61. 
29 Xiao, p. 867. 
30 Gerring and Seawright, Case study research: Principles and practices, p. 91. 
31 Bleijenbergh, p. 61. 
32 R.K. Yin, Case study research: Design and methods, Thousand Oaks, SAGE publications, 2013, 
pp. 49–50. 
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2.3 Delimitations and empirical material 
Most, if not all, academic endeavours are forced to adapt to the constraints of space, 
coherence and priority. Many of the ideas, concepts and events mentioned in this 
study are interesting enough to deserve ample room for discussion. Yet, allowing 
for the pursuit of one line of thought always comes at the cost of excluding or 
reducing another. Hopefully, though, the choices made have resulted in a product 
that strikes the right balance between focus and information. Along those lines, and 
as a first consideration on the scope of this study, it should be noted that the Brussels 
agreement will not be analysed in its entirety. Rather than briefly describing the 
extent to which each sentence is ambiguous, three themes – recognition and 
international representation and self-governance – covering just over half of the 
provisions, will be subject to analysis. Such an approach grants depth as well as 
space for elaboration on the much-needed context. Moreover, these themes are 
arguably the most delicate and, therefore, vital for the sustainability of the 
agreement. 
Regarding theoretical ambitions, it should be mentioned in the outset that there 
is no coherent framework for analysis on ambiguity. At best, there are bits and 
pieces that can be fitted together. Constructing a platform for analysis will therefore 
be a necessary enterprise, which also requires a design that starts with the basic 
tenets of communication. The perspective of this study rejects the ‘classical-
structuralist’ view on language as a “’optimal’ model of communication”. Instead, 
it adheres to the side of communication theorists that see language as having a 
rhetorical dimension, where linguistic symbols – ambiguous or specific – are used 
as a means to achieve objectives.33 As will be developed further in the theoretical 
chapter, ambiguity is much – but certainly not all – about language. 
In terms of the various implications of ambiguity, some scholars have argued 
against any use of ‘soft law’ since it might cripple the “international normative 
system”.34 When manoeuvring between politics and law, there are reasons to thread 
carefully. Typically, law is either seen as a “tool for political purpose” or as an 
“autopoietic system that has its own operational logic”.35 Like Slominski’s article 
of ambiguities in the legalisation of EU border controls, this study will follow in 
the footsteps of those institutionalist political scientists who argue that international 
law often is subordinated to political interests. 
Others have pointed towards the moral considerations associated with using 
ambiguity to conceal conflict, not seldom deeming it unfair. The principal argument 
is that a norm must be understandable in order for it to be fair. If a normative 
                                                 
33 E.M. Eisenberg, ’Ambiguity as strategy in organizational communication’, in Communication 
monographs, vol. 51, no. 3, 1984, pp. 227–228. 
34 K. Abbott and D. Snidal, ’Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, International 
Organization, vol. 54, no. 3, 2000, p. 422. See also chapter 4. 
35 P. Slominski, ‘The Ambiguities of Legalization and the EU’s Strategy of Extraterritorial Border 
Control’, European Foreign Affairs Review, no. 2, vol. 1, 2012, p. 21. 
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framework is equivocal, it automatically becomes unjust.36 In reply, theorists such 
as Eisenberg accurately points out that actors and their goals ought to be morally 
evaluated, not their strategy of choice.37 It is also appropriate to mention Pehar’s 
critique on the matter, arguing that parties to an agreement most often are perfectly 
aware of the vagueness it contains.38   
The notion of agency is a final delimitation. There are, doubtlessly, instances 
where ambiguities are unintended components of treaty design, rather the 
consequence of chance, structures or context.39 It goes without saying that these 
ambiguities might be just as vital for the outcome as provisions put there on 
purpose. Unforeseen game changers, for example, could move previously 
noncontroversial formulations into the spotlight. Nonetheless, since this study is 
primarily concerned with the intentional ambiguities other types will not be subject 
to consideration in the theory chapter. Once again, and as also pointed out by former 
EU facilitator in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, Robert Cooper, there is little doubt 
that the parties themselves have been deliberate when agreeing on ambiguous 
texts.40 Moreover, ambiguities that are not part of the design are per definition not 
contested during the negotiations and thus fall outside of the scope of the purpose 
of this study. 
Lastly, a few words on the empirical material. Although this study relies on 
official statements, reports and peer-reviewed articles, the most importance piece 
of material is the Brussels agreement in itself. The agreement is a footprint and a 
testament of a long series of negotiations, concessions and considerations, but it is 
also a roadmap and framework for future behaviour. It is upon this single document 
that much of the analysis is based. But context always matter, and I have therefore 
had great use of statements made by government representatives, to interpret how 
they portrayed their actions domestically after the final session of negotiations. All 
sources, be they newsprints, think-tank reports or articles published in journals, 
have been approached with caution. The risk of sources erring is particularly high 
in the immediate frenzy after a long-awaited agreement, and the risk of bias is 
always strong in such sensitive matters as state sovereignty. A rule of thumb has 
been to consistently cross-reference sources to make sure that my interpretation 
correlates with others. 
 
 
                                                 
36 D. Pehar, ‘Use of ambiguities in peace agreements’, J. Kurbalija and H. Slavik (eds.), Language 
and diplomacy, Msida, Diploprojects, 2001, p. 184. 
37 Eisenberg, Communication monographs, p. 228. 
38 Pehar, ‘Use of ambiguities in peace agreements’, Language and diplomacy, p. 187. 
39 N. Zahariadis, ‘Ambiguity and choice in European public policy’, Journal of European Public 
Policy, vol. 15, no. 4, 2008, p. 517. 
40 V. Hopkins, ‘Robert Cooper on Reaching Agreements between Kosovo and Serbia’, Big Deal, 
[web blog], 5 February 2015, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/blog/robert-cooper-on-reaching-
agreements-between-kosovo-and-serbia, (accessed 4 May 2015). 
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2.4 Outline of study 
The next chapter will explore the most basic aspects of ambiguous communication 
and its use in international politics. Thereafter follows the construction of a 
theoretical platform in chapter four, based on the virtues, risks and remedies of 
using ambiguity in negotiation. The fifth chapter covers the political landscape as 
it was in the period leading up to the Brussels agreement. The latter will, in turn, be 
analysed in chapter six. Finally, chapter seven contains a summary of the findings, 
as well as conclusions and recommendations for future research. 
  10 
3 Ambiguity in theory and practice 
Before studying the particularities of the Brussels agreement and its ambiguities, it 
is wise to address one of the guiding questions posed in the introduction: why would 
stakeholders allow uncertainty in high-stake agreements that seemingly have as 
sole purpose to regulate the resolution of conflicting interests? In an attempt to 
formulate an answer, the following section will take stock of available research and 
theoretical perspectives on ambiguity. A first observation is that a comprehensive 
and thorough review of the various aspects of ambiguity as a diplomatic tool is 
lacking. Instead, most scholars tend to focus only on a few aspects and dimensions 
of the concept. Therefore, and as mentioned above, this and the subsequent chapter 
aims at going beyond mere repetition and will instead attempt to offer a framework 
that more correctly reflects the complex nature of ambiguity. It will be shown that 
a lack of specificity should not be thought of as having a singular cause, purpose or 
configuration. On the contrary, ambiguity can have several rationales and comes in 
a variety of shapes. A binary perspective of language, with ambiguity in one end 
and perfect clarity at the other, will in the same vain skew the understanding of what 
essentially is a multifaceted phenomenon. More useful would be to envisage a 
continuum, where different components of an agreement are likely to hold varying 
degrees of specificity.  
In an effort to pin down the basics first and then move on to a larger perspective, 
this chapter will begin by studying the various definitions offered in the literature. 
Thereafter follows an examination the communicative function of ambiguity and, 
lastly, the different umbrella terms used by scholars of political science.  
3.1 Towards conceptual clarity  
How do we disambiguate ambiguity? Scrutinising the various definitions offered in 
the social sciences is a suitable start. Most characterisations of ambiguity take as 
their point of departure that some type of vagueness has been embedded in 
language, after which it usually follow that more than one interpretation is made 
possible. Scholars have pinned down the essentials: “a linguistic form is ambiguous 
if it can map to more than one possible meaning”,41 and is hence an “obstacle to 
any reflection on language”.42 Hence, the “inherent slipperiness of interpretation is 
                                                 
41 S.T. Piantadosia, H. Tily and E. Gibson, ‘The communicative function of ambiguity in 
language’, Cognition, vol. 122, no. 3, 2012, p. 282. 
42 Pehar, ‘Use of ambiguities in peace agreements’, Language and Diplomacy, p. 163. 
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at the heart of ambiguity”.43 In other words, it has been described as the polar 
opposite of clear and specific communication. Variations on the theme include 
indirectness, vagueness, disqualification and even under-specification.  
It is important to distinguish between communication lacking information, 
which conceptually lies closer to being vague, and the feature of holding several 
interpretations, which is associated with ambiguity. The latter feature is perhaps 
best illustrated by using idioms, as they perfectly encapsulate the way a sentence 
may hold two interpretations. A listener hearing you utter that you had a “change 
of heart” likely concludes that your mind has changed regarding a certain issue, 
whilst the literal and perhaps less likely meaning would mean that you had 
undergone a heart transplant. 
Intuitively, language is often presumed to be the transmission of information 
between individuals. Accordingly, ambiguity could be considered to act reversely 
to this basic purpose. It adds further abstraction to the data, and it is not seldom the 
case that confusion and frustration arise as consumers of language notice that there 
are two irreconcilable meanings within a message.44 However, such a narrow 
understanding of language, that is a mere conveyer of massages, would prevent a 
thorough analysis. Theorists from different schools of thought have ardently argued 
against a fixation towards “clarity”.45 Other usages could be easily be identified, 
including the expression of feelings, interests and preferences (expressive function) 
but also as a means to influence other persons’ feelings, interests and preferences 
(vocative function).46 Moreover, ambiguity should not be perceived as a peripheral 
phenomenon, but rather a widespread and established feature of language.47 
Therefore, when elaborating on the concept of ambiguity, we should not be 
restrained to think of it as just a diluent of communication.  
Whilst basic definitions of ambiguity largely could be considered to overlap, 
some diverging opinions, limitations or extensions of the concept have been 
provided. Pehar, for example, argues that for language to be recognised as 
ambiguous, it must have incompatible meanings.48 Others, like Piantadosia, Tily 
and Gibson, underscores that a full understanding never can be achieved without 
context.49 This viewpoint has been echoed Pehar, who argues that ambiguity is 
grounded in ignorance.50 
Best points out that ambiguity must be separated from the notion of uncertainty. 
The difference is most easily explained through the formers accentuation of 
interpretations: “[w]hile uncertainty can be reduced through more and better 
information, ambiguity will still persist as long as there is room for interpretation” 
                                                 
43 Best, ‘Ambiguity, Uncertainty and Risk: Rethinking Indeterminacy’, International Political 
Sociology, p. 356. 
44 D. Pehar, ’Diplomatic Ambiguity: From the Power-Centric Practice To a Reasoned Theory’, 
Polemos, vol. 8, no. 1–2, 2005, p. 155. 
45 Eisenberg, p. 228. 
46 Pehar, ‘Use of ambiguities in peace agreements’, Language and diplomacy, pp. 163–164. 
47 Piantadosia, Tily and Gibson, Cognition, p. 1. 
48 Pehar, ‘Use of ambiguities in peace agreements’, Language and diplomacy, p. 164. 
49 Piantadosia, Tily and Edward Gibson, p. 1. 
50 Pehar, ’Diplomatic Ambiguity: From the Power-Centric Practice To a Reasoned Theory’, 
Polemos, p. 155. 
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and “unlike computers, whose binary language is of 1s and 0s is free from 
ambiguity, people need to communicate through language and action – both of 
which can be open to multiple interpretations”.51 
3.2 Typology 
At this point, it has been shown that the level of clarity often varies in 
communication.  However, in order to be able to identify ambiguity, it is also 
essential to study some of the shapes appears in. A brief acquaintance with the area 
of linguistics is enough to realise that attempts to neatly package these shapes into 
a neat typology are doomed to fall short of its objective. With that caveat in mind, 
the remainder of this segment will provide a short review of four types of 
ambiguities – lexical, referential, syntactic and cross-textual – that that reoccur in 
the literature on the subject. 
Lexical ambiguity stems from the use of a word or a phrase that is associated 
with two or more meanings. The word ‘right’ is an example “that do not have a one-
to-one mapping between form and meaning”.52 It can be used to point out a 
direction, but is also as an opposite to the word ‘wrong’. When a word has multiple 
meanings it is known as a homonym. The risk of confusion is even higher in speech, 
not least because of what is known as morphemes and homophones. Regarding 
morphemes, think of the ending -s in the English language that could mean a plural 
noun such as sticks, a possessive like Lisa’s, or a present tense verb conjugation 
such as eats. With homophones the listener must figure out whether the speaker 
says for example right, rite, wright or write, or sense whether the words spoken 
ought to be separated before the s-sound in I scream and ice-cream.53 
Referential ambiguity is a word or phrase that give a person an understanding 
of what category the sender is referring to, but not the specific object.54 A common 
example, from Greek mythology, is the meeting in which Croesus consults the 
Delphi oracle on his plans for war with the Persians. The oracle predicts the 
downfall of ‘a mighty empire’ and Croesus assumes that this means the Persian 
empire, not his own or, for that matter, another empire.55 Croesus’ empire falls, and 
we learn his lesson by understanding that while categories matter, so does the 
intended object. 
Syntactical ambiguity is a consequence of the structure of language. It arises 
when the composition of a sentence is diffuse and allow for multiple 
                                                 
51 J. Best, ‘Ambiguity and Uncertainty in International Organizations: A History of Debating IMF 
Conditionality’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 56, no. 4, 2012, p. 677. 
52 J.M. Rodd, M.G. Gaskell and W.D. Marslen-Wilson, ’Modelling the effects of semantic 
ambiguity in word recognition’, Cognitive Science, vol. 28, no. 1, 2004, p. 90. 
53 Piantadosia, Tily and Gibson, p. 1. 
54 Pehar, ‘Use of ambiguities in peace agreements’, Language and diplomacy, p. 165. 
55 M.S. Nieuwland and J. Van Berkum, ‘The Neurocognition of Referential Ambiguity in 
Language Comprehension, Language and Linguistics Compass, vol. 2, no. 4, 2008, pp. 603-604. 
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interpretations.56 This phenomenon is also known as amphiboly, and has related 
concepts in the literature, such as grammatical or structural ambiguity.57 Unlike 
lexical ambiguity, syntactical ambiguity is not caused by a single word or phrase. 
The famous line uttered by Groucho Marx in the movie Animal Crackers is a 
beautiful and oft-repeated example of the effect of vagueness, which also provides 
a schoolbook example of syntactical ambiguity: “One morning I shot an elephant 
in my pajamas”. The syntactical ambiguity, of course, concern who was wearing 
the night-clothes. As a viewer, we likely conclude that it is Groucho himself, a fact 
that opens up for a comical effect as Groucho continues: “How he got in my 
pajamas, I don’t know”.58 Another well-known example occurred after a Russian 
prisoner had written a pledge of release from a Siberian prison to the ruling Tsar. 
The Tsar concisely replied: ‘Pardon Impossible To Be Executed’ and intended for 
the prisoner to be put to death. Instead of reading the text as the Tsar had foreseen, 
with punctuation after the word ‘Impossible’, the guard placed his punctuation after 
‘Pardon’, in effect giving the sentence an opposite meaning. Syntactical ambiguity 
thus resulted in his immediate release.59  
The final type is cross-textual ambiguity, which occurs as a result of the 
interplay between “inter-related sentences”.60 In a larger set of sentences, for 
example in a contract, two or more segments are in conflict, which causes the reader 
to deduce that more than one interpretation is possible. Unlike lexical and 
syntactical ambiguity then, it is not a specific word or the structure of a sentence 
that make multiple interpretations possible. Here we can think of a peace accord 
that regulates the division of power between states and a federal government.61 One 
single document may contain what seems to be an exhaustive list of competences, 
that counterintuitively is complemented with a phrasing that stipulates that one 
actor (typically the central authority) also may “exercise other additional 
competences”.62  
 In summary, the four categories show how differing interpretations can arise 
by the use of a single word, as a result of the structure in a sentence, or even between 
contradicting segments of a larger body of text. Naturally, other sub-categories and 
adjacent concepts are found in the literature. However, these either tend to overlap 
with the already mentioned categories or lack relevance for this type of study. 
                                                 
56 C.E. Dunlop and J.H. Fetzer, Glossary of cognitive science, New York, Paragon House, 1993, p. 
3. 
57 Pehar, ‘Use of ambiguities in peace agreements’, Language and diplomacy, p. 164. 
58 J.C. Cutting, ‘Comprehension vs. production’, S. Dominiek, J-O. Östman and J. Verschueren 
(eds), Cognition and pragmatics, 3rd vol., John Benjamins Publishing, Amsterdam, 2009, pp. 115–
116. 
59 M. Engels, The Fallacies and Pitfalls of Language: The Language Trap, New York, Courier 
Dover Publications, 2012, p. 22. 
60 Pehar, ‘Use of ambiguities in peace agreements’, Language and diplomacy, p. 167. 
61 Pehar, ‘Use of ambiguities in peace agreements’, Language and diplomacy, p. 167. 
62 Republic of Kosovo: Office of the Prime Minister First Agreement of Principles Governing the 
Normalisation of Relations, [website], 2013, http://www.kryeministri-
ks.net/repository/docs/FIRST_AGREEMENT_OF_PRINCIPLES_GOVERNING_THE_NORMA
LIZATION_OF_RELATIONS,_APRIL_19,_2013_BRUSSELS_en.pdf, (accessed 6 October 
2015).  For more on this dimension, see chapter 6.  
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3.3 The many labels  
Practitioners and students of negotiations are often acquainted with ambiguity. In 
diplomatic lingo, conflict studies and IR-theory, the concept constructive ambiguity 
is probably the most commonly used, which has been defined as “the deliberate use 
of ambiguous language on a sensitive issue in order to advance some political 
purpose”.63 The label tends to be associated with the undertakings of former 
American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, and intimately linked with his 
diplomacy in the Middle East. Nonetheless, scholars have leaned on a rich set of 
cases to show that ambiguous treaties have been a reoccurring feature throughout 
diplomatic history. One of the oldest examples is the agreement between Egyptians 
and Hittites in around 1280 BC, which was formulated in such a clever way that 
both sides could insist that the other side had yielded.64Another oft-cited example 
is the outcome of the Yalta Conference of 1945, perceived by some as having 
provided the basis for the Cold War.65 A few sections were considered particularly 
ambiguous and famously described by the American diplomat George Kennan in 
1954 “as the shabbiest sort of equivocation”.66 The negotiations of UN Security 
Resolution 242, regarding withdrawal of Israeli troops from territories occupied 
during the Six Days War, is another example that has been studied at length.67  
A second useful lens for understanding the ambiguous language in treaties is 
what is referred to as soft law. The hard law covers agreements that are binding, has 
a great level of detail and outlines monitoring functions. Whereas hard law helps 
parties in conflict to “reduce transactions costs, strengthen the credibility of their 
commitments, expand their available political strategies, and resolve problems of 
incomplete contracting”,68 soft law fill several other, but by no means less 
important, functions. An agreement is an example of soft law if it is constructed 
less sturdy due to more imprecise provisions, unclear definitions of responsibilities 
or weak mandates for enforcement and interpretation. These characteristics have 
been argued to make it easier to negotiate and more flexible, as the traits of soft law 
enables post-agreement reinterpretations and cloaks concessions.69  
A third and final concept is that of strategic ambiguity. First introduced by 
Eisenberg, it was an elaboration on how individuals within organisations 
                                                 
63 G. Berridge and A. James, A Dictionary Of Diplomacy, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, 
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68 Abbott and Snidal, International Organization, p. 422. 
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strategically used ambiguity to realise their goals. Besides putting agency in the 
centre, Eisenberg’s view urges us not to pass judgement on ambiguity in terms of 
ethics or effectiveness: “I am not suggesting a retreat from clarity. [...] What I am 
advocating is a shift in emphasis away from overly ideological adherence to clarity 
towards a more contingent, strategic orientation”.70 Bernheim and Whinston 
similarly use the term strategic ambiguity to label a specific type of what they call 
‘contractual incompleteness’. They argue that once ambiguity is present in an 
agreement, parties are prone to making other provisions ambiguous.71 
                                                 
70 E.M. Eisenberg, ’Ambiguity as strategy in organizational communication’, in Communication 
monographs, Vol. 51, No. 3, 1984, p. 228. 
71 D.B. Bernheim and M.D. Whinston, ‘Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity’, The 
American Economic Review, vol. 88, no. 4, 1998, pp. 903. 
  16 
4 Virtues, risks and remedies  
4.1 Ambiguity as an enabler 
With the fundamentals of ambiguous communication covered in the previous 
chapter, a suitable next step is to explore the rationales for using ambiguity as a 
component in conflict management. The first virtue of ambiguity is the prospect of 
securing additional time to negotiate.72 This specific rationale could be described 
by the following scenario: negotiators find their proceedings in deadlock or face an 
unavoidable deadline. To handle the situation, the delegates decides to use language 
that could be interpreted in a way that allows the parties to maintain their 
preferences and sustain their interpretation. This temporal dimension comes with 
several immediate advantages. Firstly, by enshrining language provisionally, the 
issues at hand can be revisited at a time more pertinent for the parties.73 A second 
attribute is that potent drafts, ideas and roadmaps are given more time to develop 
and win acceptance. Thirdly, if time is scarce, perhaps due to the risk of an eruption 
of violence, negotiators may prefer to agree to a less precise accord now, rather than 
to gamble on a more detailed version at a later stage.74  
A second way in which ambiguity can be useful is the possibility to isolate 
contentious issues in order to secure the advancement of negotiations. In this case, 
ambiguity is used to “defuse the power of an issue to scupper an overall deal”.75 It 
is easy to forget that while negotiations often revolve around one or a few core 
issues, a range of other questions usually also requires attention for an agreement 
to be sustainable in the long term. Ambiguity can, therefore, become an effective 
instrument in situations where parties can accept leaving some questions 
temporarily unresolved while moving forward on other issues.76  
The third reason for inserting ambiguity is to safeguard against internal 
criticism. In this scenario ambiguity is of use for negotiators that are more prone to 
accept a solution than they perceive key domestic stakeholders to be. Ambiguity 
helps the negotiators by allowing them to create their own interpretations and 
                                                 
72 The process of hammering out the Rambouillet agreement between the Serbian and the Kosovar-
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narratives, for example that the other party was forced to concede, that it was a win-
win situation or even that both parties were losers on equal terms. The beauty is, of 
course, that two parallel narratives can exist simultaneously. The political rationale 
is derived from the constant risks associated with taking decisions that run contrary 
to popular demand, such as putting re-election at stake or having to endure 
outspoken critique from intraparty competition. Creative euphemisms, softer 
language or avoidance of sensitive words and phrases are efficient ways of saving 
face of decision-makers,77 who thereby can avoid being held accountable.78 A 
parallel can be made to election campaigns, where politicians – often to the point 
of absurdity – refuse to take a clear position in order to avoid being caught acting 
contrary to what has been promised.79 
A fourth benefit is the flexibility that creates increased room for manoeuvre.80 
Binding, precise and exhaustive rules in agreements are often created to raise costs 
of non-compliance. As a result, the range of options available to the parties 
decreases and any form of deviation will be obvious when measured against the 
agreed-upon framework. Inversely, with an imprecise language the set of options 
available to the parties increased. Thus “authors of legal provisions tend to decrease 
its level of precision, keeping it deliberately ambiguous so that all parties involved 
may have some room to manoeuvre in pursuit of their own interests”.81  
Finally, theorists have made a case for the way in which ambiguity can initiate 
a sustainable negotiation process. Firstly, by establishing a culture of 
compromise.82 Secondly, by creating a new space that can serve as an arena for the 
conflict, ambiguity might actually make it “more channelled, orderly and 
predictable”.83  
 
 
                                                 
77 It has been said that the contemporary politics of Northern Ireland cannot be properly 
understood without taking into account constructive ambiguity. The ‘face saving’ dynamics were 
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no. 3, pp. 745.    
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674. 
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4.2 Pitfalls of ambiguity 
Ambiguity theorists are not undivided on ambiguity. On the contrary, they have at 
times been relentless in their critique, issuing warnings of “detrimental 
implications”,84 and viewed ambiguity as “a kind of Machiavellian manipulative 
device that brings but temporarily satisfaction”85 or “a euphemism […] given by 
the powerful to their lying”.86 As a result, the risks associated with ambiguity has 
come to entrench a Janus-faced perception of ambiguity amongst scholars and 
caused practitioners to advice against it “whenever possible”.87 Together these form 
a category of rationales for avoiding what Fischhendler has labelled ambiguity 
hazards.88  
The first reason for being wary of ambiguous agreements is the risk of 
producing poor outcomes. Brynen, for example, has shown that ambiguity used in 
settings that include numerous parties tend to result in “lowest-common-
denominator outputs and pronouncements”, and that it largely is a means to hide 
disagreement.89 Others have argued that conflicts are sustained, prolonged and 
hidden, through the use of ambiguity, rather than being settled. According to this 
logic, each negotiating party has the “right to interpret ambiguities in their own 
irreconcilable ways and that is a right they will certainly, sooner or later, start 
exploiting”.90 Vague wording can, therefore, result in a post-agreement period that 
mirrors tensions from the negotiations, instead of creating the favourable milieu 
that proponents of ambiguity want to portrait. Pehar goes as far as to view ambiguity 
as a form of intellectual armament, that is ready to be used as soon as parties are 
pressured to deliver upon promises, and “for that reason implementation of an 
agreement is very likely to fail”.91 
A second risk is associated with the problem of ensuring compliance. Well-
defined boundaries and enforcement mechanisms have been considered necessary 
components of a rule-based system.92 Meyers emphasised the merits of 
straightforward language already in 1917: “[i]n treaties, above all other public 
documents, accuracy of language is essential to insure freedom from dispute”.93 
Consequently, by inserting ambiguity into agreements, actors are at risk of making 
the system opaque and therefore disobedience difficult to penalise. Scholars that 
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are critical to the strategic use of ambiguity have similarly argued that without 
unequivocal rules and consequences, the costs of non-abidance decreases.94 The 
trade-off comes in terms transactional costs in the post-contract period, as parties 
are able to claim that their violations are in line with agreed upon language.95 
The third type of risk is the cloaking of divisive intentions, such as the use of 
ambiguity as a “pretext for a rupture of relationships”.96 In this scenario, a 
negotiator accepts ambiguous language in an agreement as a part of a strategy to 
create a rift in interpretations at a later stage. At a moment of its choosing, the actor 
can intentionally resurface its original position, in effect letting the agreement 
become a means to create conflict.97 It also provides an opportunity to ‘freeload’ by 
capitalising on the benefits of entering into an agreement. Ambiguity thereby allows 
actors to await and act on a relatively stronger position in the future.  
4.3 Remedies  
Although the risks listed in the previous section can be deterring, mediators and 
stakeholders have methods to increase the level of control. Given that the problem 
relates to the uncertainty that arise in the post-agreement period, mechanisms that 
disambiguate the content can create conditions that lessen the chance of disobedient 
behaviour and encourages breakthrough on difficult issues. These mechanisms 
could come in the shape of a committee tasked with implementation of the 
agreement, or as a roadmap for how to proceed in the areas that were purposely left 
vague.98  
Another strategy is to transfer “authority to a central party to implement, 
interpret, and adapt the agreement as circumstances unfold”.99 This particular 
counterweight to ambiguity could be difficult to achieve as it ultimately boils down 
to questions of state sovereignty and control. Still, a third party might be entrusted 
with some measure of authority, such as independent validation of progress on 
commitments set out in an agreement. 
A third alternative is to design linkages between specific issues. This is put into 
practice by making the implementation of certain provisions conditioned on clearly 
defined progress in other areas.100 The fulfilment of a commitment by one part of 
an agreement is thereby set to trigger an automatic reaction by the other part. 
Disarmament could, for example, be stipulated to begin once the ratification of an 
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amnesty law is completed, and withdrawal from a territory initiated after ceasefire 
has lasted for a pre-defined period of time.  
These mechanisms of mitigation listed do not necessarily have to be specified 
in advance. A regime or institution created in the post-agreement phase can be just 
as valuable. What is important is to create institutions, mechanisms or incentives 
that assist parties in honouring their agreements. This step-by-step type of conflict 
management have been called a ‘gradualist approach’, and has been championed 
by some for its potential to entrench a culture of compromise.101 
Summing up, the last two chapters have outlined a platform for answering the 
research question posed in the introductory chapter. The nitty-gritty of ambiguity 
has been covered, as well as the mechanisms that makes it a strategic, although 
risky, choice. The next chapter will provide a short perspective on the break-up of 
Yugoslavia and the commitment by the EU towards the Western Balkans region, 
followed by a segment on the positions of the negotiating parties, as well as the 
formal mediator.  
                                                 
101 Fischhendler, p. 114. 
  21 
5 Prelude – the road to agreement  
In 1991, Jacques Poos, head of the Council of the European Union and Foreign 
Minister of Luxembourg Foreign Minister, uttered the infamous words that since 
have come to embody the European naivety at the advent of the Yugoslavian 
disintegration: “This is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans”.102 The 
decade of wars, atrocities and regional tension that followed included the wars of 
Slovenian and Croatian independence, the Bosnian War and the Kosovo War, as 
well as the collapse of Albania and the crisis in Macedonia. Poos was proven wrong 
and statesmen around Europe became painfully aware of the limited capacity of 
both the EU and the individual countries on the continent.103 It is a widely held 
perspective that the failure of Europe to prevent a violent implosion of Yugoslavia 
actually paved the way for a more coordinated take on security and foreign policy. 
As far as this study is concerned, however, this claim is far less interesting than 
another important shift in policy that followed: an EU perspective for the Western 
Balkans.104  
The perspective was firstly expressed in June 2000 when the Feira Council 
declared the Western Balkans countries as “potential candidates for EU 
membership”.105 Three years later the commitment was consolidated through the 
integration mechanism known as the Stabilisation and Accession Process, and a 
grand promise stating that “[t]he future of the Balkans is within the European 
Union”.106 Although the process was ridden with setbacks, the countries gradually 
and in varying pace moved closer to the Union.  
Constantly looming over the vision of an enlarged European Union was a fear 
that the difficulties in overcoming the hostilities between Serbia and Kosovo would 
be insurmountable. Although the enmity certainly has deep historical roots,107 the 
disputes that needed solving surfaced in connection to the Kosovo War of 1998–
                                                 
102 D.S. Hamilton, ‘The United States: A Normative Power?’, N. Tocci (ed.), Who Is A Normative 
Foreign Policy Actor? Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008, p.102. 
103 C. Bickerton, B. Irondelle and A. Menon, ‘Security Co-operation beyond the Nation-State: The 
EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 49, no. 1, 
2011, p. 4.; and.B. Giegerich and W. Wallace, ‘Not such a soft power: the external deployment of 
European forces’, Survival, vol. 46, no. 2, 2004, pp. 164–165. 
104 M. Braniff, ‘Transforming the Balkans? Lesson Learning and Institutional Reflexivity in the 
EU Enlargement Approach’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 14, 2009, p. 555. 
105 Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria de Feira European Council 19-20 June 2000, para. 67, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei1_en.htm, (accessed 12 March 2015) 
106 General Affairs Council, 16 June 2003, Annex A, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/workarea/downloadAsset.aspx?id=40802198187, (accessed 12 
March 2015) 
107 For an excellent study of the importance of the Fields of blackbirds in the Serbian historical 
narrative, see T. Judah, The Serbs: History, myth, and the destruction of Yugoslavia, London, Yale 
University Press, 2009. 
  22 
1999. With no peace in sight, NATO initiated a bombing campaign on 23 March 
1999, forcing Serbia to surrender two and a half months later.108 In June, UNSC 
Resolution 1244 was voted through, which “recogniz[ed] continued Yugoslav 
sovereignty over Kosovo” but also set out that the area would be subject to UN 
administration  until a “process could be launched to reach a ‘ﬁnal settlement’ on 
its status”.109 Although the matter of status certainly was the most contested issue, 
a wide range of other – and often related – disputes needed to be settled in order to 
achieve a lasting solution. 
The EU initiated or embraced several attempts and strategies to resolve the 
tensions. These include the largely unsuccessful ‘Standards before status’110 and 
‘Standards implementation plan’, the series of high-level meetings initiated in 
Vienna in 2005,111 as well as the technical process facilitated by EU diplomat 
Robert Cooper from 2011. As we approach the landscape of negotiations as it 
appeared prior to the Brussels agreement, it is worth remembering that this process 
was far from the first initiative supported by the Union.  
5.1 Serbia – a reluctant dialogue partner 
The thought of negotiating on equal terms with Pristina was unfathomable in 
Belgrade after the war. Not equally sensitive, albeit far from entrenched in Serbian 
society, was the question of European integration. Yet these two issues ultimately 
came to be intertwined, with the latter acting as a pull factor for the former. The 
growing eagerness of Serbia to become a member of the EU made it possible for 
EU and its member states to start calling for normalised relations between Belgrade 
and Pristina. To explain the sudden leap forward prior to the Brussels agreement, 
several scholars have underlined changes in the internal and external political 
dynamics.  
One these factors were the unanticipated ousting of the President, Boris Tadić, 
by the electorate in the presidential elections of 2012. Overnight it became apparent 
to the political cadre in Belgrade that the poor status of the state finances tended to 
worry voters more than the status of Kosovo.112 Few had predicted the outcome of 
the presidential elections, and probably even fewer thought it would bring Serbia 
closer to the EU. Indeed, it has been argued the entire rationale for the West’s 
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patience with the delinquency of Tadić and the Democratic Party, was the fear of 
what might come in their stead.113  
A second and related factor was that the resistance against EU membership had 
decreased substantially prior to the 2012 parliamentary elections. By then, most of 
the Serbian parties had accepted the EU path as a key political objective. The U-
turn of the Progressives was perhaps the most dramatic change, which in effect 
pushed the anti-western sentiment to the margins of the discourse. Vojislav 
Koštunica’s Radical Party and other hard-liners found themselves at the fringes of 
the political spectra.114 As a result, one of the desirables for pro-enlargement 
strategist around Europe was thus reality; a political dynamic had emerged in the 
shape of a race where parties tried to outbid each other with promises related to the 
EU-accession.  
External factors are also thought to have set the stage. Germany had been 
building up pressure on Serbia since 2011 when Chancellor Angela Merkel 
“publicly read the riot act”115 to President Tadić after a summer of raising tensions 
in northern Kosovo.116 Alongside these expectations, Berlin and other capitals 
warned Belgrade of several deadlines that approached rapidly on the horizon, which 
would severely infringe on the available alternatives. These included the German 
federal elections of September 2013, the European parliament elections in May 
2014 and the inertia associated with forming a new European Commission. As 
future efforts risked being eclipsed by external events, the new government 
understood that it was time to make “a tough choice between European integration 
and self-isolation”.117   
5.2 Kosovo – a hesitant yet impatient participant 
At first glance, the negotiating team from Pristina might seem to have been in a 
more convenient position than their Serbian counterparts. With the United States 
firmly backing Kosovo statehood, and a large majority of the EU member states 
pushing for further integration, it is easy to envisage a steady and inevitable 
movement towards membership and recognition. Yet, as politicians in Kosovo have 
had to learn the hard way, even the smallest exchange with their northern neighbour 
causes ruckus internally. Media outlets and domestic actors are constantly attentive 
for concessions to Belgrade that would risk the statehood and functionality of 
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Kosovo.118 Expectations on advancing the process of recognition are therefore 
always present, just as the diametrically opposite is true for Serbian negotiators. It 
was, for example, through this prism that Kosovars viewed with suspicion that the 
European Union took over from the US as the main strategist for the Western 
Balkans. They feared a scenario in which Brussels would slow down or suspend 
talks about status, in order to also accommodate Serbian aspirations.119 
Another case that bear witness of the internal pressure in Kosovo was the 
behaviour of the government in 2010. On 22 July, the International Court of Justice 
released its advisory opinion on the lawfulness of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration 
of independence. Frustration within the ranks grew despite a ruling in Pristina’s 
favour, stating that the: “declaration did not violate any applicable rule of 
international law”.120 The government decided to take action by sending a rapid-
reaction task force to the northern parts of Kosovo, an area which had been 
perceived as an obstacle in the state-building process for years.121 A policeman was 
fatally wounded and the border area came under lockdown by the KFOR, the NATO 
peace-keeping force. Unsurprisingly, the ongoing talks were put on hold.122 Taken 
together, some of Kosovo’s preconditions was strikingly different in comparison to 
Serbia. But when it comes to the high stakes and domestic pressure in relation to 
contacts with its counterpart, they shared a similar burden. 
5.3 The EU – a stakeholder and a goal in itself 
Structurally, the EU is not an ordinary mediator or, as it has been labelled 
throughout the process, a facilitator. Besides this role, the Union is also in itself a 
goal for the two parties, in the sense that they want to become members one day. 
This gives the EU a unique position, with substantial leverage. However, one 
feature that above any other defines the relations between Brussels on the one hand, 
and Pristina and Belgrade on the other, is the tense division between EU member 
states on the question of status. Out of the 28 member states, 23 have recognised 
Kosovo as a sovereign entity.123 Nonetheless, formal as well as informal relations 
with Kosovo have been substantial, which at times required a creative use of 
language to circumvent the status issue.124 The European Union should not be seen 
as a unitary actor, and few policies make that so abundantly clear as the disparate 
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views on Kosovo. Perhaps surprisingly, this division might simultaneously have 
contributed to the ability of the EU to act as a credible mediator. With members on 
both sides of the fence, its facilitating role is perhaps viewed with less suspicion. 
The EU’s firm hand on policies for Serbia’s and Kosovo’s political and 
economic future was initiated as late as 2010. By then, as mentioned above, 
Brussels had a long track record of unsuccessful attempts to get Kosovo and Serbia 
to commit to a mutual process. In 2010 a press release was issued in connection to 
the opinion by the International Court of Justice, reaffirming the European 
perspective of both Serbia and Kosovo, and stressing the principle of good 
neighbourly relations. More importantly though, a message was communicated that 
the EU was ready to act as a facilitator in a dialogue process.125 In parallel, Belgrade 
was pressured to co-sponsor a EU-drafted resolution that mirrored the press 
statement.126 The first step in a process that ultimately resulted in the Brussels 
agreement was thereby a fact and six months after the General Assembly resolution 
was voted through, the parties meet in Brussels for a first round of dialogue. The 
negotiations can be thought of as separated into two phases, the first from March 
2011 to February 2012 under the leadership of the EU diplomat Robert Cooper. The 
second leg from October 2012 and onwards, directly supervised by the High 
representative.127 I would argue that there are merits to this simplification, provided 
that the division is not drawn too far.  
In conclusion, the brief examination of the period leading up to the negotiations 
indicates that several factors made the political landscape more pertinent for 
reaching an agreement. Some of the rationales that was mentioned in chapter four 
as conducive for ambiguity could be noted, such as the deadlines facing Serbia and 
the incentives of advancing in the EU-track. Another contextual component was the 
domestic settings in both Serbia and Kosovo, which made concessions and change 
in policy costly. A final parameter was the divide between member states on 
Kosovo’s status, a question that ought to make ambiguity a comfortable solution 
also for the mediator.  
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6 Describing the Brussels agreement 
On 19 April 2013, under the auspices of High Representative Catherine Ashton, the 
Prime Ministers of Kosovo and Serbia, Ivica Dačić and Hashim Thaçi, inked their 
initials on a modest looking fifteen-point document titled First Agreement of 
Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations. Together the paragraphs 
stipulated rules and steps aimed at setting the framework for normalisation. The 
agreement covered sensitive questions that included governance in northern 
Kosovo and integration into EU and was hailed as a critical juncture even before its 
ratification. Still, as the content was scrutinised and its effects explained to the 
public, two opposing interpretations emerged. One version claimed that Serbia had 
de facto recognised Kosovo as a sovereign entity with control over its entire 
territory. According to another interpretation, the legitimisation of Serbian-backed 
so-called ‘parallel structures’ in northern Kosovo would create “a Bosnian type of 
‘Republika Srpska’ in Kosovo”,128 reinforcing existing fears of “a state within a 
state”.129 The domestic criticism that ensued in both Kosovo and Serbia could 
hardly have come as a surprise to the premiers, yet they still chose to accept the 
mediators bid.  
In an effort to answer the research question posed in the introduction, this 
chapter will examine segments in the Brussels agreement and interpretations 
presented by the negotiating parties. Three themes of the negotiations have been 
chosen: recognition and international representation, self-governance in northern 
Kosovo and security.  
6.1 Recognition and international representation  
As evident from earlier segments, the most contentious dimension in the 
relationship between Kosovo and Serbia is the status issue. Two separate but 
interconnected aspirations Kosovo are worth mentioning: international recognition 
as a sovereign state and the ability to be represented in international organisations. 
Historically, Pristina has pursued a long-term strategy of trying to achieve the latter 
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as a means to realise the former, through what is called ‘indirect collective 
recognition’.130 Meanwhile, Belgrade has with matching vigour refused any steps 
towards recognised independence, using its influence to prevent Pristina from 
getting any seats at tables in the international arena.131 For these reasons, signs of 
recognition, representation and symbols of independence were much sought after 
by one side, and highly sensitive for the other side, throughout the negotiation 
process. An illustrative outcome of these dynamics within the Brussels agreement 
appears as one starts to look for what is not there. The stern refusal of any symbols 
of Kosovo’s independence is a skill that Belgrade had perfected over the years, and 
consequently, the Brussels agreement lacks titles, state symbols and even names. 
This should be seen in the light of a form of recognition, in which explicit references 
to a state official is used to recognise the sovereignty of a state, and hence something 
Serbia keenly would avoid.132 
Article 14 in the Brussels agreement is the only section which explicitly touches 
upon the question of international participation, yet it is limited to EU integration 
and does not even mention membership: ”It is agreed that neither side will block, 
or encourage others to block, the other side’s progress in their respective EU 
paths”.133 From an EU point of view, this safeguard is a necessity, as member states 
on bilateral grounds have been blocking acceding states, thus interfering with the 
principle of a merits-based process.134 It is also a necessity for the non-recognising 
quintet. Just as the Union’s policy towards Kosovo in general, article 14 is 
ambiguous on whether Kosovo one day will become a member state Although that 
the aspiration of Pristina, such a step would require “Kosovo’s status to be solved 
definitely”.135 The fact that article 14 stipulates that Belgrade will not block 
Pristina’s path towards EU does not settle the matter – the ambiguity remains.  
Studying how the status issue was described by stakeholders to the agreement 
is a rewarding exercise in understanding ambiguity surrounding article 14 as well 
as the legal status of the document. On the day of the agreement, the Serbian Prime 
Minister Dačić told the press how the Serbian negotiation team successfully 
managed to avoid the far-reaching demands made by Kosovo. A formulation 
stipulating that Kosovo would be able to join regional and international 
organisations, such as NATO and the UN, was said to have been on the table at an 
earlier stage, put forward by High Representative Ashton. Instead, Dačić’s 
interpretation of the outcome was that it “only states that Serbia must not stand in 
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the way for Kosovo’s European integration”.136 At the same time, Deputy Prime 
Minister Vučić told reporters that Kosovo had “accepted all Serbian 
suggestions”.137 Taking the interpretation one step further, Serbian presidential 
advisor Marko Đurić made the following statement: “With this agreement we have 
received a permanent guarantee that Serbia does not have to accept Kosovo’s UN 
membership”, adding that “it will not be forced to recognize its independence”. 
Continuing, he added that “No one, from Catalonia to Basque Country, has 
managed to get what we have. We did not let them join international organizations 
and we will create institutions that will be controlled by the Serbs”.138  
Meanwhile, in Pristina, the opposition party Lëvizja Vetëvendosje voiced a 
similar interpretation, arguing that the agreement effectively had “suspended 
entirely state-building of Kosovo”.139 In stark contrast to these readings, 
government representatives stated that the deal meant a “factual recognition of 
Kosovo”.140 Enver Hoxhaj, Kosovo’s foreign minister, used social media to 
communicate his view on the outcome, suggesting that “with this agreement Serbia 
has accepted Kosovo’s international subjectivity, sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and the constitution and laws”.141 These types of statements were criticised by 
Serbia as being manipulative lies,142 but some Serbian law experts have argued 
along the same lines. According to them, by allowing northern Kosovo to be 
integrated into the Kosovo, and by withdrawing support for the so-called parallel 
institutions, Serbia both de facto and de jure recognised the independence of 
Kosovo.143 Similarly, Ker-Lindsay sees the agreement as “an implicit acceptance 
of the existence of an autonomous Kosovo, the legitimisation of its government and 
the acceptance of its separate EU integration process […]. This was an enormous 
sacrifice for any Serbian government”.144 It should perhaps be stressed at this point 
that the legal effects are of no relevance for this study. What is of interest is the way 
ambiguity of the agreement helped both actors to manage their internal political 
situation, by offering wiggle room for interpretations and further negotiations.  
To recapitulate, the political leaders had provided vastly different 
interpretations of the same text through their descriptions, as would have been 
predicted by ambiguity theorists. By doing so, they could try to safeguard against 
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domestic critique. Alongside the rhetoric on governance issues, the outcome also 
suggests that Serbia managed to isolate the contentious status issue, whilst 
accepting advancement on other issues in order to secure benefits from EU 
accession process.145 Given the concession made, the issue was defused in a clever 
way, as no language hinted that the position on recognition had changed. 
Lastly, a point on theory. The argument concerning whether Kosovo was 
recognised or prevented from gaining a UN seat illustrate an important gap in the 
framework presented in chapter 4. In it, nothing was mentioned about ambiguous 
processes or legal considerations of the actions of states. The contrasting statements 
were not solely derived from the text of the agreement, but also from a tradition of 
how states are recognised in the international community.146 This observation 
suggests that theory on ambiguity has a blind spot, to which I will return in the 
concluding chapter. 
 
6.2 Self-governance in northern Kosovo 
Negotiating the future governance of northern Kosovo may, at first, be mistaken for 
a simple matter of deciding statutes for a cooperative body of municipalities. In 
reality, it is more like a miniature version of managing the question of Kosovo’s 
status, and has for good reasons been called “a litmus test not only for the 
consolidation of Kosovo’s statehood but also for the normalization of relations”.147 
Beneath the surface lies several disputes over fundamental questions that require 
compromises and attention to detail.  
A general challenge is to incorporate the independent Serb-dominated areas in 
the north into the Kosovo state structure while simultaneously ensuring minority 
demands of subsidiarity and rights to participation.148 Institutionally, this means 
merging the local police, court and government structures into the existing system 
governed by Pristina. Another six municipalities with Serb majority population 
below the Ibar River are to be a part of the cooperation, but these are already fully 
integrated and less prone to voice their critique against Belgrade. In 2007, one of 
the most detailed and ambitious attempts to outline such a scheme was the 
‘Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement in 2007’, also known 
as the Ahtisaari plan.149 A variation of this proposal was presented by Serbian 
president Tadic in 2008, but neither of the two resulted in any successful measures.  
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Given the above, it should come as no surprise that one of the most explicit 
ambiguities in the First agreement concerns governance in the north. It is a 
referential type of ambiguity and can be found already in the opening article. The 
purpose is to introduce the establishment of a cooperative entity of municipalities, 
but the language chosen for the label is purposely diffuse: “There will be an 
Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo” (emphasis 
added).150 Here, the negotiating parties could not agree on what type of entity the 
group of Municipalities should become, and hence decided to use both 
‘Association’ and ‘Community’, separated by a slash.151 Evidently, no single 
agreeable word could encompass both parties interpretations, and the resulting 
ambiguity became remarkably visible. In the remainder of the document, the two 
words shift order back and forth between ‘Association/Community’ and 
‘Community/Association’, suggesting that even the sequence was deemed 
important. As the implementation phase would show, these details are expressions 
of the wide rift between the negotiating parties, that ultimately relates to the future 
status and function for this entity within the Kosovo’s governance system. Or, as 
another scholar has pointed out, “[t]he word ‘association’ will become the most 
important word” in the agreement.152 
Another instance of ambiguity is found under articles four and five. Together 
they stipulate that the “Association/Community will have full overview of the areas 
of economic development, education, health, urban and rural planning” and that it 
“will exercise other additional competences as may be delegated by the central 
authorities” (emphasis added).153 The keywords in these sentences are ‘full 
overview’, ‘will’ and ‘may’. Whereas the former fail to disclose the exact degree 
of competence distribution, the latter two adds substantial ambiguity in specifying 
whether additional competences will be added at all. Taken together, in a typical 
case of cross-textual ambiguity, uncertainty is created regarding the distribution of 
powers.  
The articles on governance were ridden with ambiguity, and again the 
negotiating parties shared with the media their contrasting interpretations. 
Immediately after the agreement was struck, the government of Kosovo’s 
government announced that the deal would ensure the “integration of northern 
Kosovo”, and that it would “put an end to illegal structures”.154 The Serbian 
perspective underscored that it would become an ‘ethnic-Serbian institution’ and 
went as far as to claim that it would be “recognized by Pristina and the EU”.155 The 
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Presidential advisor Marko Đurić explained to the domestic media how the Brussels 
agreement ensured “legalized Serbian institutions” and that Serbia – not Serbs in 
northern Kosovo – would have “more powers in education system, health, public 
information and spatial planning”.156 These were the interpretations that would 
allow the parliaments to accept the historic deal. Of course, both sides questioned 
the other sides understandings of the agreement, and in both capitals, the 
governments face tough resistance from opposition parties. Serbian politicians 
marched, chanting “Treason, treason” and “We won't give up Kosovo”157. 
Meanwhile in Pristina, parliamentarians raised banners that described the bill of 
approval as “The resolution of submission to Serbia”, and told media that “Kosovo 
is turning into a Bosnia… the north of Mitrovica is becoming like [the capital of 
Serb-run Bosnian entity Republika Srpska] Banja Luka”.158  
Summing up, is safe to conclude that if put on a spectrum, these interpretations 
would create quite a polarised picture. The negotiating parties used the virtues of 
ambiguity mentioned in chapter four, thus creating enough room of manoeuvre to 
try to minimize the critique. Hereby the appealing power offered by ambiguity is 
illustrated. Furthermore, by exploring the importance attached to the municipal 
entity, we can understand both the difficulty in agreeing on a name and the vigorous 
attempts to establish their own definition. In Serbia, they discuss an ‘entity’, while 
in Kosovo they refer to an ‘NGO’, “thus it is not without Irony that Lady Ashton 
who brokered the deal applauded the two sides for having found common 
language”. 159 
6.3 Security 
The third and final dimension of the Brussels agreement concerns security. In 
divided communities, such as those in northern Kosovo, with contested authority 
and history of violence,160 security is naturally a vital component. After the war, 
displaced Serbs from the south built an independent system in the North, mirroring 
that of Pristina, which was managed by United Nations Interim Administration in 
Kosovo. Since the latter derived its authority from resolution 1244, which also 
ended Yugoslav sovereignty in Kosovo, the Serbian municipalities denied any form 
of cooperation with the UN representation.161 The local security structures consisted 
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of approximately 500–600 individuals through the Serbian Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Security Information Agency. Adding to that, 67 smuggler 
organisations acted in the area.162 The lack of control over the territory became 
increasingly difficult to handle for politicians in Pristina, as the deployment of rapid 
action police forces in 2011 became a testament for. 
Subsequent to the governance provisions in the Brussels agreement are articles 
that cover police, security and command structures. Article 7 establish that there 
will be only one “police force in Kosovo called the Kosovo Police. All police in 
Northern Kosovo Police shall be integrated in the Kosovo Police framework. 
Salaries will be only from KP”.163 Meanwhile, article 8 states that “Members of 
other Serbian security structures will be offered a place in equivalent Kosovo 
structures”.164 Whilst the provision on police merger is relatively straightforward, 
the article on security structures contain several ambiguities. First of all, in a case 
of referential ambiguity, it is unclear exactly what is meant by ‘other security 
structures’. The same organisations are called ‘civil protection groups’ by Belgrade 
and ‘paramilitary structures’ Pristina.165 Another dimension of interest is the 
payment solution. Whereas the procedure for salaries is made clear for the Kosovo 
Police, nothing is mentioned in relation to the security structures, nor the remaining 
institutions referred to in the agreement.  
Once again the two narratives collide as government officials describe the 
content of the articles. Pristina put an emphasis on the dismantled presence of 
Serbia, which is to occur through the phasing out of Serbian security structures. 
Belgrade, on the other hand, portrays the outcome as an increase in security. An 
“ethnic-Serbian institution will be created, which for the first time will is recognized 
by Pristina and the EU”.166 In sum, just like the other two dimensions of the Brussels 
agreement, the security dimension also contained ambiguities. These were once 
again exacerbated through the interpretations shared by the negotiating parties, and 
a source of confusion.  
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7 Conclusion 
7.1 An agreement disambiguated 
This study argues that ambiguity was a fundamental component in how the Brussels 
agreement came to be shaped and presented. Before reiterating the findings that 
underpin such a claim, imagine for a moment that the outcome of the negotiations 
on 19 April 2013 would have to be put down in print, communicated and defended 
with a language that was exempt from the use of ambiguities. Needless to say, 
tangible compromises under such a setting is unfathomable. Instead, and as shown 
in the previous chapters, language that can sustain divergent interpretations give 
enough leeway for political leaders to face their publics, albeit armed to the teeth 
with euphemism and generous readings.  
Unsurprisingly, not all components of the theoretical framework were reflected 
in the description of the case. An outbreak of violence was for example never a 
pressing issue, nor was there scope enough in this study to evaluate whether a 
culture of compromise could have been created. Yet other aspects contributed to 
understanding and describing the case, such as the immense pressure by 
constituents and opposition parties, and deadlines of elections that threatened to 
postpone progress in the EU track. The typology also improved the analysis by 
providing a way to label categories of ambiguities that otherwise are difficult to 
pinpoint.  
When the agreed formulations were juxtaposed with the statements made by 
officials, the dynamics of ambiguity was illustrated beyond the initial expectations. 
Here the theoretical legwork paid off substantially, as descriptions of provisions 
and statements showed exactly how flexible language creates alternatives for 
decision-makers. Amongst other observations, the findings in chapter six suggest 
that ambiguity was used to safeguard against criticism, to isolate contentious issues 
and to increase the room for manoeuvre.  
Most importantly, this study set out to see how ambiguity shaped the agreement 
and the way it was described by its stakeholders. Set against the summary above, 
that particular ambition ought to be fulfilled. As a final comment on the design, a 
few words should be mentioned regarding the choice of case. As far as these types 
of cases even can be considered representative of its class of events, I would argue 
that the Brussels agreement made the cut and fulfilled the parameters set out in the 
introduction.  
7.2 A theory in development 
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A second ambition mentioned in the outset was to develop existing theory. To the 
extent that the patchwork of ambiguity collected in this study even can qualify as a 
proper theory, I would argue that it has theoretical relevance. Indeed, already by 
extensively exploring and listing the numerous rationales, risks and remedies, this 
study goes beyond comparable studies of ambiguity. And even though many 
components never were applicable to the case, there is merit in trying to get as 
comprehensive understanding of a puzzling phenomenon as possible.  
Of even more value, although initially perhaps a sign of flaws with the 
theoretical framework, is the discovery of new phenomena related to ambiguity, 
that did not fit the predefined template. The first warrants further exploration is 
ambiguous processes, which in the present case came in the shape of a legal 
tradition. When the Serbian government had to argue against a notion that the 
agreement was a de jure recognition, it not only had to relate to the language of the 
text but also to a tradition of how states legitimise statehood. The fixation towards 
language is, therefore, something future researchers should try to overcome. A 
second observation relates to remedies and the design of linkages between of issues, 
with the purpose to ensure compliance. A version of this category has been 
discussed in the literature and was covered in chapter four. However, a description 
of situations with influential third party incentives is clearly lacking. In our case, 
Serbia’s willingness to compromise was directly connected to rewards in the EU 
accession process. In brief, further research is needed to study how carrots from an 
external part can be included in a design to prevent non-abidance. A third finding 
that calls for further study is the way officials use ambiguity to paper over a leap 
made between an old and a new position. To some extent, this concept overlap with 
the face-saving rationale mentioned earlier, but there is still ample room for 
investigating the intersection between the concept of framing and ambiguity. 
7.3 More or less ambiguity 
Lastly a few words on how to view ambiguity in terms of efficiency. It has been 
written that “ambiguity in diplomatic documents must be avoided whenever 
possible, but it occurs nevertheless, sometimes by design, sometimes by 
inadvertence, sometimes by necessity”.167 In the case of Serbia and Kosovo, 
scholars and opinion-makers have disagreed on whether the normalisation process 
would benefit from more or less straightforwardness.168 Based on findings from this 
study, it is easy to argue that ambiguity can work wonders in terms of making your 
                                                 
167 Krogh, U.N. Security Council Resolution 242: A case study in diplomatic ambiguity, p. v. 
168 T. Judah, ‘Brussels Trumps “Inat”’, Eastern Approaches, [web blog], 10 September 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2010/09/serbia_kosovo_and_un, (accessed 4 
May 2015); and G. Krasniqi, ‘Kosovo’s political impasse and the limits of EU’s ‘creative 
ambiguity’ approach’, ECFR Commentary, [web blog], 19 November 2015,  
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_kosovos_political_impasse_and_the_limits_of_eus_5020, 
(accessed 24 November 2015). 
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preferred messages fit, but also that the aftermath can leave a lot to be desired. In 
many senses, ambiguity has been viewed upon as double-edged sword.169  
Any perspective that holds ambiguity as the cause of an agreement would be 
built on faulty premises. On the contrary, treaties and accords are the results of 
actors’ preferences and the context within which they exist. As hinted at earlier, 
ambiguity is better thought of as an enabler – tool that can curtail negative effects 
and provide new options. The outcome is more likely a consequence of the 
readiness to find common ground through compromise, rather than the result of 
design. For that reason, I would concur with theorists stressing that another mind-
set is needed. If parties to a negotiation view ambiguous language as an undefined 
space, rather than a place where their own priorities must prevail, then ambiguity 
ultimately can provide lasting solutions. Accordingly, scholars have argued that 
mediators would benefit from be explicit about drafts and intentions. That would 
not only mean to clearly point out in which ways provisions are ambiguous. 
Mediators should also express expectations on the parties to set their imagination 
towards finding an acceptable middle-ground.170  
If avoiding being precise can move a peace agenda forward, for example by 
gradually defusing tension around a contentious issue, then that is fine and dandy. 
But if the negotiation process and drafting process does not take the post-agreement 
phase into account, the risk of a backlash cannot be disregarded. Consequently, the 
sustainability of the Brussels agreement may very well be dependent on the consent 
of the population in northern Kosovo. Their cooperation rest on them being 
comfortable with integrating into the structures of Kosovo, recalling that “they have 
been told for three decades by Belgrade that they are an indivisible part of 
Serbia”.171 Yet one thing should not be lost in the measurement of progress: “the 
fight over interpretation is infinitely better than physical violence”.172 Furthermore, 
through the Brussels agreement something was created where there earlier was 
nothing. The loose structure of negotiation that has occurred on-and-off since April 
2013 has a purpose (normalisation), a method (regular interaction) and plenty of 
carrots (accession and financial support) to offer. And the strength of incentives 
should not be underestimated: 
 
The union, after all, is in a mess. The euro could yet collapse, bringing economic 
mayhem. Besides, inside the EU, small states such as Serbia have very little 
influence over the way in which decisions are made. Yet so badly do Serbs and 
Kosovars want to join the bloc that they ignored those arguments, plus deep national 
scars and red lines, to cut a deal with each other on April 19.173  
                                                 
169 Fischhendler, p. 113. 
170 Pehar, ‘Use of ambiguities in peace agreements’, Language and diplomacy, p. 189. 
171 B. Weber and K. Bassuener, ‘Not Yet a Done Deal: Kosovo and the Pristina-Belgrade 
Agreement’, Democratization Policy Council Policy Paper, 2013, p. 2. 
172 Pehar, ‘Use of ambiguities in peace agreements’, Language and diplomacy, p. 189. 
173 T. Judah, ’Kosovo Deal Shows the EU Deserved its Nobel Prize’, Bloomberg View, 23 April 
2013, http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-04-23/kosovo-deal-shows-the-eu-deserved-
its-nobel-prize, (accessed 20 May 2015). 
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